The ASEAN+3 proposal has attracted attention in Asia. We argue that a free trade agreement (FTA) for ASEAN+3 is beneficial to all member countries due to three factors: (i) existing and expected vertical foreign direct investment linkage between Japan/Korea and ASEAN member countries, (ii) high expected growth rate of the Chinese economy, and (iii) the economic diversity among members of ASEAN+3 group.
Introduction
Since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), there have been more than 240 regional trade arrangements (RTAs) or preferential trade arrangements (PTAs), a large portion of which are regional free trade agreements (FTAs).
The pace of PTA growth since the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is much faster than before the WTO existed. The proliferation of PTAs has attracted public attention.
While many countries are involved in more than one PTA or FTA, it is interesting to observe that there are relatively few PTAs or FTAs in Asia, and some Asian countries have not participated in any PTA or FTA. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 by the Bangkok Declaration, but it was initially for political purposes. It was only in 1992 that ASEAN became an economic entity when members decided to establish the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
In 1994, the leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea were invited for the first time to attend the annual ASEAN forum as dialogue partners. During the November 2000 ASEAN summit in Singapore, the idea of extending AFTA to Northeast Asia to create a greater East Asia trade and economic grouping -the ASEAN+3 FTA --was suggested by President Kim Dae-jung of South Korea. In addition, Premier Zhu Rongji of China also proposed the creation of a China-ASEAN free trade zone in a move aimed at easing the region's concerns over a negative backlash from China joining the WTO. Although the goal of formally enlarging AFTA to include all countries in East Asia was deemed premature, the leaders of the ASEAN+3 countries agreed to form an expert panel to study the idea seriously. 1 1 On a less formal level, the ASEAN+3 process of expanding and deepening cooperation between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea is rapidly gaining momentum. The ASEAN+3 finance ministers have embarked on solid cooperative undertakings. These include the joint monitoring of financial and economic movements in East Asia and in the world and a network of currency swaps and repurchase agreements to make resources available to countries in balance-of-payments difficulties. The ASEAN+3 economic ministers have agreed on priority areas for cooperation and the guidelines for carryi ng out such cooperation. ASEAN's particular relationship with Japan has been moving forward, with its own forums for financial and economic cooperation. Most recently, senior trade officials from the ASEAN+3 countries met in March 2001, and agreed on four projects to be included in the ASEAN+3 process, aiming at establishing conformable industrial standards, strengthening the competitiveness of small scale enterprises, and training
The main motivation behind the ASEAN+3 proposal is to help all members match the pace of globalization and benefit from the economic developments of the region.
Although the proposal includes many areas of cooperation, such as capital flow and exchange rates, in this paper we mainly address the international trade issue. More specifically, we ask if there should be an FTA for ASEAN+3.
While the formation of an ASEAN+3 FTA may produce both negative and positive effects on each of the member countries as well as on the rest of the world, we would argue that it will provide great benefits to the member countries. Among many reasons for the need to establish an FTA among ASEAN+3 countries, we focus on three important characteristics of this region's economic ties and developments. First, the At a more general level, Whalley (1998) In the rest of the paper, we first describe the economic features of East Asia (Section 2) , and then we analyze the welfare implications of establishing the ASEAN+3 FTA (Section 3). Concluding remarks are offered in Section 4.
The Economies of ASEAN+3
The ASEAN+3 countries exhibit considerable diversities in size, factor endowment, economic structure, trade orientation, level of economic development, and socio-cultural background. An overview of the ASEAN+3 economies is reported in Besides tariff reduction and elimination of non-tariff measures, AFTA also seeks progress on trade facilitation and has established a dispute settlement mechanism to enhance transparency, equity, and accountability in the AFTA process.
Direction of Trade
To learn more about the intra-regional and extra-regional trade of the ASEAN+3 countries, we report trade matrices (for total trade, export, and import) in Tables 2 to 4 .
One noteworthy feature in Table 2 is that intra-ASEAN trade flow, as represented by an intra-regional trade share of about 23%, is relatively low compared with extra-ASEAN trade. This is in sharp contrast to the EU bloc, the world's most integrated trading bloc, which has an intra-regional trade share of nearly 63%. In fact, ASEAN's intra-regional trade share is about the same size as its extra-regional trade share with the "NE-Asia3" countries of China, Japan, and Korea. On the other hand, East Asia (ASEAN+3 plus Hong Kong and Taiwan) as a bloc registers an intra-regional trade share of 49%. One is tempted to conclude that ASEAN does not in fact function as an economic bloc, despite its formal regional arrangement as an FTA, whereas East Asia taken as a whole does function as a trading and investment bloc even though there is no formal preferential trading arrangement. As pointed out by Anderson and Norheim (1993) , Drysdale and Garnaut (1982 , 1983 ), and Frankel (1997 , among others, simple trade shares can be misleading because it is a necessary property of the intra-regional share measure that the larger the set of countries one considers, the higher will be the apparent concentration of trade within the set. This is clear if one considers the extreme case of trade shares for the Earth. Obviously one would find a ratio of 100 percent. One simple way to adjust for the regional size effect, as suggested by Frankel (1997) , is to divide a regional trade share by that region's share of world trade. The result is a concentration ratio that can be smaller or larger than one. If the concentration ratio between a pair of countries is larger than one, this means that trade is more concentrated between the pair than with a typical country elsewhere in the world. In Tables 2 to 4 concentration ratios are reported in italics underneath the trade shares. In Table 2 , according to the metric of concentration ratios, we see that ASEAN does function significantly as a regional trading bloc, with an intraregional concentration ratio of 3.97 that is even higher than the EU value of 1.72. This means that trade is indeed geographically concentrated. Whether or not this is due to natural factors such as geographical proximity or to preferential trade policies requires more elaborate statistical data and analyses.
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Concerning extra-regional trade, trade shares indicate that the US is the most important extra-regional trading partner with ASEAN, followed by Japan, the NE-Asia3 together, and the EU. A different ranking, however, emerges from the concentration ratios that control for the size effect. Japan comes up as the most important trading partner with ASEAN, followed by the US and the EU. Moreover, after controlling for the size effect, Japan alone is equally important as all three NE-Asia3 countries together as a trading partner with ASEAN. Note that ASEAN is not, by implication, the most important trading partner with Japan. By setting Japan as the home country, we see that ASEAN is second to the US in Japan's trade concentration. However, the relative importance of ASEAN as a trading partner with Japan should not be underestimated. As measured by the relative magnitude of concentration ratios (1.12/1.24 = 0.9), Japan's trade with ASEAN is only 10% less concentrated than her trade with the US. Compared with the EU, ASEAN is three times more concentrated in Japan's trade (1.12/0.37 = 3), even though the trade share for the EU is higher.
[ Tables 2-4 about here]
3.
Creating an ASEAN+3 FTA?
FDI Linkage: ASEAN, Japan and Korea
In this section, we examine the benefits of establishing an FTA between ASEAN and Japan and/or Korea by focusing on the role of foreign direct investments. Table 5 reports the distribution of East Asia's inward FDI in 1994. As can be seen from the table,
Japan is the most important extra-regional FDI source for ASEAN countries, followed by the US, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Japan and Korea together contribute about 20 -30% of FDI flows into ASEAN countries and, in the case of Brunei, as much as 50%. The ASEAN countries have abundant endowments of natural resources and manpower. And this is reflected in their export product mix, which concentrates on primary products and labor-intensive goods (Table 1) . ASEAN is a major supplier of key raw materials in the 8 For example, by estimating gravity equations as in Frankel (1997).
world market. For example, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore together supplied 18.6% of Japan's total import of fuels in 1999 (WTO, 2000, Table IV .23). This has been a key reason for attracting Japanese and Korean FDI inflows.
[ Table 5 about here]
Another significant factor that has attracted FDI flows to ASEAN is the expansion of ASEAN to embrace all of Southeast Asia. An ASEAN with all ten countries of the region is not only a fulfillment of the vision of ASEAN's founders, it is also a stronger force for regional stability. This gives foreign investors more confidence to locate their operations in this region. Moreover, there exist great differences among all member economies. As a result, whether a potential investor looks for high-technology capability, efficiency in services, abundant raw materials, or low-cost labor, the investor can always find it in one or another ASEAN country.
Japan and Korea may have similar incentives to establish an FTA with ASEAN. One of the main incentives must come from these countries' increasing economic ties via FDI.
While Japanese and Korean firms may have different motivations for their FDIs in ASEAN, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers on both sides of the borders after the formation of an FTA will definitely benefits existing FDI. We must stress that the benefits are larger for multinational firms engaging in vertical FDI. There are abundant evidences on the nature of Japanese vertical FDI in ASEAN. Based on the data set complied from the MITI's 1992 survey of Japanese multinational enterprises in Asia, Belderbos, et al. (2000) observe the following: on average, of the total procurement by electronic subsidiaries of Japanese MNEs in ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), only 32% is from the local economies, 47% is from Japan, and 21% from the other countries. The local procurement is relatively low compared to their counterparts in Hong Kong (48%) and Taiwan (50%).
The above finding is not special to the MITI data set. From other sources, Capannelli (1997) also finds that Japanese subsidiaries in the Malaysian electronics industry buy an overwhelming share of components from Japanese suppliers. The reliance of Japanese overseas affiliates on components and material imports from Japan is also found by other researchers including Kreinin (1992) , Graham and Krugman (1990) and Froot (1991 With vertical FDI, a product usually has to cross borders several times before the final stage. For example, the parent firms in Japan or Korea focus on product design and final-stage packaging and marketing, while their subsidiaries in ASEAN countries concentrate on the labor-and material-intensive parts of the production stage. Reducing transaction costs in general and lowering trade barriers in particular will help these multinational firms tremendously.
On the other hand, since a significant portion of the Japanese FDI and the Korean FDI in ASEAN takes the form of vertical FDI, the FDI flows and international trade between Japan/Korea and ASEAN tend to complement each other. Hence, while FTA will facilitate FDI flows from these countries to ASEAN, the increased FDI flows in turn will increase trade in this region. Bhagwati and Tironi (1980) have examined the welfare implications of PTA in the presence of FDI, but here we consider the interplay of FTA and FDI. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that studies economic integration in the presence of FDI related to Asian countries is that by Abe and Zhao (2000) . In their model, Abe and Zhao (2000) assume that a Japanese firm establishes a joint venture (JV) in ASEAN with a local firm in order to overcome trade barriers and to take advantage of low-wage labor.
The product of the JV is sold locally. Japan also exports both an intermediate input and the final product to ASEAN. Instead of examining the effects of free trade between Japan and ASEAN, they consider a tariff reduction by ASEAN. On one hand, they find that reducing ASEAN's tariff on the final output imported from Japan increases the exports and profits of the parent firm in Japan and decreases the output of the JV and the profits of the local firm. On the other hand, they show that reducing ASEAN's tariff on the intermediate input reduces the output of the parent firm but raises that of the JV. The total welfare effect is positive for Japan but ambiguous for ASEAN.
The above model and results are not readily applicable to the ASEAN+3 FTA because some important considerations have not been taken into account. First, many Japanese (and Korean) firms producing in ASEAN countries also export back to Japan (and Korea), to take advantage of low labor and resources costs. In fact, Kojima (1975) found that some multinational firms invest in the host country's comparative advantage sectors in order to employ low-cost production factors. A large number of Japanese FDIs are of this type. The Japanese investments in the developing countries of Asia are largely in labor-intensive and resource-based industries, in which the host countries have comparative advantages. 9 Indirect evidence to support this claim can be found in Lipsey (2000) and Baek and Okawa (2001) . Lipsey (2000) argues that the pattern of exports may reflect the comparative advantages of the host countries and over the period from 1974 to 1995 Japanese firms' affiliates were responsible for about 7% of developing Asian countries' exports. Baek and Okawa (2001) find that over 9% of the total exports of ASEAN 4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) was by Japanese subsidiaries in 1997 and their export share was about 25% in electrical sector.
In addition to the comparative advantages of ASEAN countries as a reason for such type of FDI inflows, most host economies of ASEAN pursue outward-looking or export-oriented development strategies. Therefore, these governments particularly encourage export-oriented FDI inflows. For example, the foreign firms' shares of exports in non-petroleum industries in Thailand were 11.3% in 1977 11.3% in , 15.9% in 1986 11.3% in and 27.3% in 1989 11.3% in (Tongzon, 1998 States, comparing with a share of 13.5% in 1998.
On the trade side, although Japan remains one of ASEAN's three leading trading partners, its share of ASEAN's trade has been diminishing since the early 1990s. Japan's share of the imports from ASEAN shrank steadily from almost 25% in 1993 to a little more than 19% in 1999 (Table 4 ). The share of the Japanese market in the exports of ASEAN countries went down from 15% in 1993 to 12.5% in 1999 (Table 3) in the first year, and the level of FDI will essentially double. Baek and Okawa (2001) examine Japanese FDI in 6 Asian economies (South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand) and 8 manufacturing sectors from 1983 to 1992. They find that high import tariff rates in the host countries significantly decrease Japanese investment inflow to those countries.
To confirm our argument that Japanese FDI flows to ASEAN are special and increase in response to the formation of the Association and also the continuous trade liberalization of the Association. We discuss below our empirical model, methodology, data, findings and their implication on the impact of FTA on FDI flows.
We use gravity model to examine how Japanese FDI outflows are determined by independent factors including host countries' GDP, population, distance to Japan, trade openness. Gravity model has been used widely in empirical trade studies. Recently, it has also been applied to study FDI (e.g., Brenton, et al, 1999 and Wei, 2000) .
(Fred: please describe more on methodology and data…).
[ Table 6 about here] Equation 1 as follows: lnFDI = C + a 1 lnGDPP + a 2 lnDIST + a 3 lnPOP + a 4 lnOPENNESS + a 5 ASEAN5 + a 6 NAFTA + a 7 OECD24 + epsilon, Where FDI is …(Fred: please add)
As commonly found, Japanese FDI outflows are larger if the host country's per capita GDP is higher, the host country is closer to Japan geographically, or the host country has a larger population. In addition, we obtain two interesting findings, relevant to this study. First, host country's trade liberalization, captured by openness (commonly used as the result indicated liberalization, e.g., Ross, ????), has positive effect on Japanese FDI. This is consistent with the complementarity relationship between trade and FDI. Second, Japanese FDI responds to regional trading blocks differently. As shown in Table 6 , while Japanese FDI outflows respond positively to NAFTA, OECD24 (Japan is one of the member), and ASEAN5, only the relationship to ASEAN5 is significant. This implies Japanese firms' special connection to this region.
We run a second regression to examine Japanese FDI's response to regional trading blocks' external liberalization. lnFDI = C + a 1 lnGDPP + a 2 lnDIST + a 3 lnPOP + a 4 ASEAN5*lnOPENNESS + a 5 NAFTA*lnOPENNESS + a6 OECD24*lnOPENNESS + epsilon.
The interaction terms capture Japanese FDI response to a particular region's external trade liberalization. From Table 6 , we note that the responses to all three regions' trade liberalization are positive, but only the effect from ASEAN5 is significant. This says that when ASEAN5 lower their external tariffs to Japan, Japanese FDI outflows to those countries increase. Hence, FTA encourages FDI flows.
Similarities and Differences: ASEAN and China
If China stays out of the ASEAN+ trading bloc, it will face two changes in the region. First, ASEAN is deepening its integration (completing AFTA by 2002 and further deepening trade liberalization and enlarging the product coverage of AFTA). Second, there will be more economic cooperation among Japan, Korea and ASEAN. Either one of these changes will put China, as an outsider, in a disadvantageous position. Basically, China will suffer from both trade diversion and FDI diversion. This changing regional environment should strengthen China's incentive to join the regional bloc with ASEAN, Japan and Korea. A similar argument is also provided by Baldwin (1995) While ASEAN leaders welcome the FTA proposal, there are concerns over the impact of the giant country's entry into the WTO. They are also worried that investment money would be diverted from their region to China. On the contrary, China believes that its membership to the WTO would actually bring about a "win-win situation", for China and ASEAN alike. First, by accession to the WTO, China's market will become bigger, which in turn will create more business opportunities for ASEAN countries. Second, China and ASEAN countries vary in economic structure and export mix. 10 In what
follows, we will first analyze the impact of China's WTO accession and then discuss the implications of an FTA between ASEAN and China.
As a matter of fact, China's WTO accession has caused a lot of concern in both developed and developing countries. Typically, people in ASEAN countries worry that since their products are competing with Chinese products in both the export markets and their domestic markets, they will lose their competitiveness in the world markets. On one hand, ASEAN countries have to give tariff concessions to China, based on MFN, in their domestic market, and the increased imports from China will reduce import competing industries' profits and employment. On the other hand, developed countries will also give tariff concessions to China in their markets. This will reduce ASEAN exporters' competitive advantage in those markets when competing with the Chinese exporters.
While the above argument is true to some extent, it ignores some other important aspects of the situation. First, is it truly the case that China and ASEAN countries are competing head to head in all markets? Generally speaking, these countries have overlaps in their product lines and therefore compete in every market in these products. Second, upon entering WTO, China must lower its protection levels in all products. For those sectors in which both China and ASEAN have comparative advantage, producers who export from ASEAN to China will benefit from China's lowering of the protections. It is not clear that these producers, even if they are competing with Chinese counterparts, need to be worse off even though they face tougher competition in their domestic markets and in the developed countries' markets.
[ Table 7 about here]
While it is not too difficult to predict which sector of which country will benefit or lose from China's accession to the WTO, it is difficult to estimate the degrees of benefits or losses for a given sector. It is even more difficult to analyze whether, for any country, the benefits are greater than the losses. There have been some attempts to analyze these issues, however. As Lejour (2001) summarizes, most studies that make use of a computable general equilibrium model conclude that both China and its major trading partners, including Japan and Southeast Asian countries, will benefit from China's entry into the WTO. Both Bach et al. (1997) and Wang (1997) predict that China (including Hong Kong) will have a net welfare gain of about US$30 annually. Ianchovichina and Martin (2001) show that China and its major trading partners gain from China's WTO accession, while some competing countries suffer small losses in the third market from a static point of view. However, since China will realize higher economic growth after its trade liberalization, Arndt et al. (1997) conclude that ASEAN will in turn benefit greatly from China's economic growth. Using the GTAP model, Lejour (2001) finds that ASEAN countries benefit mainly from China's lower trade barriers in sectors such as textiles, apparel, leather products, and lumber and wood.
We now examine the implication of the above analysis on a China and ASEAN FTA. For that reason, let us exclude Korea and Japan from the ASEAN+3 FTA for a moment and return to them later. There are two differences between China's accession to the WTO and China's free trade with ASEAN, in regard to the impacts on the ASEAN economies. First, both China and ASEAN will further deepen their trade liberalization vis-à-vis each other in the case of an FTA. Although trade liberalization definitely hurts some sectors while it benefits some others, it is commonly recognized that mutual trade liberalization must benefit each economy as a whole. This is also a proposition in international trade theory, under both perfect competition and imperfect competition.
Second, introducing FTA would not affect much the competition between China and ASEAN countries in any third market. The pessimists from ASEAN regarding China's accession to the WTO argue that the increased competition in third markets will reduce their competitiveness and lower their profits. As pointed out above, even taking this possible negative effect into account, most studies still find that both China and ASEAN would benefit from mutual penetration of each other's markets due to lower protections. 11 Hence, compared to China's accession to WTO, an FTA helps both regions further benefit from deeper trade liberalization in both markets, without generating negative effects in third markets. As a result, both China and ASEAN will surely benefit from the establishment of an FTA.
Diversity of ASEAN+3 Economies
Having analyzed FTA between ASEAN and the other three individual countries, we now turn to considering the 13 countries of the ASEAN+3 together.
From Table 6 , we see that in every sector except products in SITC 1 (beverages and tobacco), at least one of ASEAN+3 countries has comparative advantage in the world market. Specifically, Japan, Korea and Singapore have comparative advantage in capital and technology intensive goods (those in SITC 7). China and other ASEAN countries have comparative advantage in either natural resource-intensive products (SITC 0 to 5), natural resource-intensive manufactured goods (SITC 6), or labor-intensive manufactured goods (SITC 8). To see more along the line of diversity, rather than competition, Table 7 presents some statistics on trade between ASEAN and China, Korea and Japan in 1996 for some specific sectors. [ Table 8 about here]
Although having a rich diversity in members' economies would not allow an FTA to escape the negative effect of trade diversion, the magnitudes of trade diversion would be much lower because of diversity, provided that the potential member are efficient producers of a wide range of products. This can be easily seen from the following "example". One possible trade diversion is a switch in the demand for American cars to a demand for Japanese cars. But if this occurs, the cost is not too large since Japan already produces cars very efficiently. That is, the trade diversion effect is minimal. However, if
Japan could not produce automobiles and the trade diversion leads led to an import of Chinese automobiles, we would expect to see very large effects of trade diversions.
It is important to note that diversity is not a sufficient condition for FTA to escape negative trade diversion and efficiency is a necessary condition. If FTA results in trade diversion from efficient American producers to very inefficient Chinese producers, welfare loss will be large. However, this is unlikely to be the case in reality. On the one hand, if Chinese producers are extremely inefficient, the tariff advantages given to them over the American counterparts from FTA will not be sufficient to divert ASEAN's import from the US to China. On the other hand, it is evident that economic reform in China since 1979 has improved the economy's efficiency tremendously. Decentralization and market competition has led state owned enterprises to enhance its competitiveness in order to survive in a market economy. Furthermore, efficient private sectors and foreigninvested enterprises have played a more and more important role in the economy. For example, in 2002 foreign-invested enterprises contributed to more than 50 per cent of China's exports. Although some inefficient producers (state owned enterprises) helped by the governments may still remain in the market for some time, their role is diminishing and will be less important by the time ASEAN+3 has been formed.
The above analysis is based on the trade-creation and trade-diversion aspects of FTA. Given the rich differences among the ASEAN+3 countries, one can also examine additional benefits from FTA in ASEAN+3 by going through Whalley's (1998) other five reasons or objectives for individual countries to join an FTA. We omit this relatively straightforward analysis for the sake of space.
Concluding Remarks
We support the ASEAN+3 FTA proposal based on the analysis of the FDI linkage and economic diversity of the region. Further analysis can be taken in the following directions.
First, the paper by Spilimbergo and Stein (1998) Source: http://www.aseansec.org.
